Abstract. In [12] a private approximation of a function f is defined to be another function F that approximates f in the usual sense, but does not reveal any information about x other than what can be deduced from f (x). We give the first two-party private approximation of the l2 distance with polylogarithmic communication. This, in particular, resolves the main open question of [12] .
Introduction
Recent years witnessed the explosive growth of the amount of available data. Large data sets, such as transaction data, the web and web access logs, or network traffic data, are in abundance. Much of the data is stored or made accessible in a distributed fashion. This neccessitates the development of efficient protocols that compute or approximate functions over such data (e.g. see [2] ).
At the same time, the availability of this data has raised significant privacy concerns. It became apparent that one needs cryptographic techniques in order to control data access and prevent potential misuse. In principle, this task can be achieved using the general results of secure function evaluation (SFE) [33, 18] . However, in most cases the resulting private protocols are much less efficient than their non-private counterparts 3 . Moreover, SFE applies only to algorithms that compute functions exactly, while for most massive data sets problems, only efficient approximation algorithms are known or are possible. Indeed, while it is true that SFE can be used to privately implement any efficient algorithm, it is of little use applying it to an approximation algorithm when the approximation leaks more information about the input than the solution itself.
In a pioneering paper [12] , the authors introduced a framework for secure computation of approximations. They also proposed anÕ( √ n)-communication 4 two-party protocol for approximating the Hamming distance between two binary vectors. This improves over the linear complexity of computing the distance exactly via SFE, but still does not achieve the polylogarithmic efficiency of a non-private protocol of [25] . Improving the aforementioned bound was one of the main problems left open in [12] . In this paper we provide several new results for secure computation of approximations. Our first result is anÕ(1)-communication protocol for approximating the Euclidean ( 2 ) distance between two vectors. This, in particular, solves the open problem of [12] . Since distance computation is a basic geometric primitive, we believe that our result could lead to other algorithms for secure approximations. Indeed, in [1] the authors show how to approximate the 2 distance using small space and/or short amount of communication, initiating a rich body of work on streaming algorithms.
In the second part of the paper, we look at secure computation of a near neighbor for a query point q (held by Alice) among n data points P (held by Bob) in {0, 1} d . We improve upon known results [10, 13] for this problem under various distance metrics, including 2 , set difference, and Hamming distance over arbitrary alphabets. Our techniques also result in better communication for the all-near neighbors problem, where Alice holds n different query points, resolving an open question of [13] , and yield a binary inner product protocol with communication d + O(k) in the common random string model. Hamming distance [14] O(kd) O(nd 2 + n 2 ) All-near neighbors [13] 
However, all of our protocols for the near neighbor problem have the drawback of needing Ω(n) bits of communication, though the dependence on d is often optimal. Thus, we focus on what we term the approximate near neighbor problem. For this we introduce a new definition of secure computation of approximations for functions that return points (or sets of points) rather than values.
Approximate privacy. Let P t (q) be the set of points in P within distance t from q. In the c-approximate near neighbor problem, the protocol is required to report a point in P cr (q), as long as P r (q) is nonempty. We say that a protocol solving this problem is c -private (or just private if c = c) if Bob learns nothing, while Alice learns nothing except what can be deduced from the set P c r (q). In our paper we always set c = c.
We believe this to be a natural definition of privacy in the context of the approximate near neighbor problem. First, observe that if we insist that Alice learns only the set P r (as opposed to P cr ), then the problem degenerates to the exact near neighbor problem. Indeed, even though the definition of correctness allows the protocol to output a point p ∈ P cr − P r , in general Alice cannot simulate this protocol given only the set P r . Thus, in order to make use of the flexibility provided by the approximate definition of the problem, it seems necessary to relax the definition of privacy as well. Second, the above relaxation of privacy appears natural in the context of applications of near neighbor algorithms. In most situations, the distance function is only a heuristic approximation of the dis-similarity between objects, and there is no clear rationale for a sharp barrier between objects that can or cannot be revealed (still, it is important that the information leak is limited). Our model formalizes this intuition, and our algorithmic results shows that it is possible to exploit the model to obtain more efficient algorithms.
Specifically, within this framework, we give a c-approximate near neighbor protocol with communicationÕ(n 1/2 + d) for any constant c > 1. The protocol is based on dimensionality reduction technique of [25] . We show how the dependence on d can be made polylogarithmic if Alice just wants a coordinate of a point in P cr . We also give a protocol based on locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) [23] , with communicationÕ(n 1/2+1/(2c) + d), but significantly less work (though still polynomial).
Finally, proceeding along the lines of [20] , we say the protocol leaks b bits of information if it can be simulated given b extra bits which may depend arbitrarily on the input. With this definition, we give a protocol withÕ(n 1/3 + d) communication leaking only k bits, where k is a security parameter.
General vs specific solutions. As described above, this paper offers solutions to specific computational problems. In principle, a general "compiler-like" approach (as in [33, 18] ) would be preferable. However, it appears unlikely that a compiler approach can be developed in the context of approximate problems. Indeed, there is no general method that, for a given problem, generates an efficient approximation algorithm (even ignoring the privacy issue). This implies that a compiler would have to start from a particular approximation to a given function. Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, such approximation itself can leak too much information.
This argument leads us to believe that, in context of approximate algorithms, designing efficient private solutions to specific problems is the only possible approach.
Preliminaries
Background on homomorphic encryption, oblivious transfer (OT), and secure function evaluation (SFE) can be found in appendix A. We write negl(k, n) to denote an arbitrary negligible function of k, n, that is a function which shrinks faster than any inverse polynomial in n, k.
We assume both parties are computationally bounded and semi-honest, meaning they follow the protocol but may keep message histories in an attempt to learn more than is prescribed. In [18, 7, 29] , it is shown how to transform a semihonest protocol into a protocol secure in the malicious model. Further, [29] does this at a communication blowup of at most a small factor of poly(k). Therefore, we assume parties are semi-honest in the remainder of the paper.
We briefly review the semi-honest model, referring the reader to [17, 26] for more details. Let f : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * be a function, the first element denoted f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) and the second f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ). Let π be a two-party protocol for computing f . The views of players P 1 and P 2 during an execution of π(x 1 , x 2 ), denoted View π 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) and View π 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) respectively, are:
where r i is the random input and m i,j the messages received by player i respectively. The outputs of P 1 and P 2 during an execution of π(x 1 , x 2 ) are denoted output x 2 ) ). We say that π privately computes a function f if there exist PPT algorithms S 1 , S 2 for which for i ∈ {1, 2} we have the following indistinguishability x 2 ) is deterministic or equals a specific value with probability 1 − negl(k, n), for k a security parameter.
We need a standard composition theorem [17] concerning private subprotocols. An oracle-aided protocol (see [26] ) is a protocol augmented with a pair of oracle tapes for each party and oracle-call steps. In an oracle-call step parties write to their oracle tape and the oracle responds to the requesting parties. An oracle-aided protocol uses the oracle-functionality f = (f 1 , f 2 ) if the oracle responds to query x, y with (f 1 (x, y), f 2 (x, y)), where f 1 , f 2 denote first and second party's output respectively. An oracle-aided protocol privately reduces g to f if it privately computes g when using oracle-functionality f .
Theorem 1.
[17] If a function g is privately reducible to a function f , then the protocol g derived from g by replacing oracle calls to f with a protocol for privately computing f , privately computes g.
We now define the functional privacy of an approximation as in [12] . For our approximation protocols we will have f 1 (x, y) = f 2 (x, y) = f (x, y). Definition 1. Let f (x, y) be a function, and letf (x, y) be a randomized function. Thenf (x, y) is functionally private for f if there is an efficient simulator S s.t. for every x, y, we havef (x, y) c ≡ S(f (x, y)).
A private approximation of f privately computes a randomized functionf that is functionally private for f .
Finally, we need the notion of a protocol for securely evaluating a circuit with ROM. In this setting, the ith party has a table R i ∈ ({0, 1} r ) s defined by his inputs. The circuit, in addition to the usual gates, is equipped with lookup gates which on inputs (i, j), 
Private 2 Approximation
Here we give a private approximation of the 2 distance. Alice is given a vector
n , and Bob a vector
In addition, parameters , δ and k are specified. For simplicity, we assume that k = Ω(log(nM )). The goal is for both parties to compute an estimate E such that
2 with probability at least 1−δ, for x def = a−b. Further, we want E to be a private approximation of x , as defined in section 2. As discussed there, wlog we assume the parties are semi-honest. We set the parameter B = Θ(k); this notation means B = ck for a large enough constant c independent from k, n, M, δ, . In our protocol we make the following cryptographic assumptions.
1. There exists a PRG G stretching polylog(n) bits to n bits secure against poly(n)-sized circuits. 2. There exists an OT scheme for communicating 1 of n bits with communication polylog(n).
At the end of the section we discuss the necessity and plausibility of these assumptions. Our protocol relies on the following fact and corollary.
Fact 3 [27] Let A be a random n × n orthonormal matrix (i.e., A is picked from a distribution defined by the Haar measure). Then there is c > 0 such that for any x ∈ n , any i = 1, . . . , n, and any t > 1,
Corollary 1. Suppose we sample A as in Fact 3 but instead generate our randomness from G, rounding its entries to the nearest multiple of 2 −Θ(B) . Then,
Proof. If there were an infinite sequence of x ∈ [M ] n for which this did not hold, a circuit with x hardwired would contradict the pseudorandomness of G.
Protocol Overview: Before describing our protocol, it is instructive to look at some natural approaches and why they fail. We start with the easier case of approximating the Hamming distance, and suppose the parties share a common random string. Consider the following non-private protocol of [25] discussed in [12] : Alice and Bob agree upon a random O(log n)×n binary matrix R where the ith row consists of n i.i.d. Bernoulli(β i ) entries, where β is a constant depending on . Alice and Bob exchange Ra, Rb, and compute R(a−b) = Rx. Then x can be approximated by observing that Pr[(Ra
The communication is O(log n), but it is not private since both parties learn Rx. Indeed, as mentioned in [12] , if a = 0 and b = e i , then Rx equals the ith column of R, which cannot be simulated without knowing i.
However, given only x , it is possible to simulate E. Therefore, as pointed out in [12] , one natural approach to try to achieve privacy is to run an SFE with inputs Ra, Rb, and output E. But this also fails, since knowing E together with the randomness R may reveal additional information about the inputs. If E is a deterministic function of Ra, Rb, and if a = 0 and b = e i , Alice may be able to find i from a and R.
In [12] , two private protocols which each have Ω(n) communication for a worst-case choice of inputs, were cleverly combined to overcome these problems and to achieveÕ( √ n) communication. The first protocol, High-Distance Estimator, works when x > √ n. The idea is for the parties to obliviously sample random coordinates of x, and use these to estimate x . Since the sampling is oblivious, the views depend only on x , and since it is random, the estimate is good provided we takeÕ( √ n) samples. The second protocol, Low-Distance Estimator, works when x ≤ √ n. Roughly, the idea is for the parties to perfectly hash their vectors intoÕ( √ n) buckets so that at most one coordinate j for which a j = b j lies in any given bucket. The parties then run an SFE with their buckets as input, which can compute x exactly by counting the number of buckets which differ.
Our protocol breaks this O( √ n) communication barrier as follows. First, Alice and Bob agree upon a random orthonormal matrix A in R n×n , and compute Aa and Ab. The point of this step is to uniformly spread the mass of the difference vector x over the n coordinates, as per Fact 3, while preserving the length. Since we plan to sample random coordinates of Ax to estimate x , it is crucial to spread out the mass of x , as otherwise we could not for instance, distinguish x = 0 from x = e i . The matrix multiplication can be seen as an analogue to the perfect hashing in Low-Distance Estimator, and the coordinate sampling as an analogue to that in High-Distance Estimator.
To estimate x from the samples, we need to be careful of a few things. First, the parties should not learn the sampled values (Ax) j , since these can reveal too much information. Indeed, if a = 0, then (Ax) j = (Ab) j , which is not private. To this end, the parties run a secure circuit with ROM (see section 2) Aa and Ab, which privately obtains the samples.
Second, we need the circuit's output distribution E to depend only on x . It is not enough for E[E] = x 2 , since a polynomial number of samples from E may reveal non-simulatable information about x based on E's higher moments. To this end, the circuit uses the (Ax) j to independently generate r.v.s z j from a Bernoulli distribution with success probability depending only on x . Hence, z j depends only on x .
Third, we need to ensure that the z j contain enough information to approximate x . We do this by maintaining a loop variable T which at any point in time is guaranteed to be an upper bound on x 2 with overwhelming probability.
Using Corollary 1, for all j it holds that q def = n(Ax) 2 j /(T B) ≤ 1 for a parameter B, so we can generate the z j from a Bernoulli(q) distribution. Since T is halved in each iteration, for some iteration E[ j z j ] will be large enough to ensure that E is tightly concentrated.
We now describe the protocol in detail. Set = Θ(B)(1/ 2 log(nM ) log(1/δ)+ k). In the following, if q > 1, then the distribution Bernoulli(q) means Bernoulli(1).
2 -Approx (a, b):
1. Alice, Bob exchange a seed of G and generate A as in Corollary 1 2. Set T = T max 3. Repeat:
(a) {Assertion: x 2 ≤ T } (b) A secure circuit with ROM Aa, Ab computes the following -Generate random i 1 , . . . , i and compute (Ax)
Note that the protocol can be implemented in O(1) rounds by parallelizing the secure circuit invocations.
Lemma 1. The probability that assertion 3a holds in every iteration of step 3 is 1 − neg(k, n). Moreover, if x 2 = 0, then when the algorithm exits, with
, so we may condition on this event occurring. If x 2 = 0, then Ax = 0, and thus Pr[E = 0] = 1.
Otherwise, x 2 ≥ 1. Consider the smallest j for which T max /2 j < ||x|| 2 . We
The assertion holds at the beginning of the jth iteration by our choice of T . Thus, n(Ax) Pr[ j z j < /(4B)] = neg(k, n), so if ever T = T max /2 j−1 , then this is the last iteration with overwhelming probability.
Note that the second part of the lemma follows from standard Chernoff bounds. Indeed, if x 2 = 0, then we have shown with overwhelming probability that in some iteration, T ≥ 1 and i z i ≥ /4B, so we may condition on the event that the algorithm exits in such an iteration. But for a certain constant in the big-Oh notation, one can show (by Chernoff and union bounds) that the probability
Thus, this holds when the algorithm exits. By Lemma 1, assertion 3a holds, so
Privacy: We replace the secure circuit with ROM in step 3b of 2 -Approx with an oracle (see section 2). We construct a single simulator Sim, which given Sim (∆):
With probability 1 − neg(k, n), the matrix A satisfies the property in Corollary 1, so we assume this event occurs. In each iteration, the random variables z j are independent in both the simulation and the protocol. Further, the probabilities that z j = 1 in the simulated and real views differ only by a multiplicative factor of (1 − 2 −B ) as long as T ≥ ∆. But the probability that, in either view, we encounter T < ∆ is neg(k, n).
Complexity. Given our cryptographic assumptions, we useÕ(1) communication and O(1) rounds. Remark 1. Our cryptographic assumptions are fairly standard, and similar to the ones in [12] . There the authors make the weaker assumptions that PRGs stretching n γ bits to n bits and OT with n γ communication exist for any constant γ. In fact, the latter implies the former [21, 15] . If we were to instead use these assumptions, our communication would be O(n γ ), still greatly improving upon the O(n 1/2+γ ) communication of [12] . A candidate OT scheme satisfying our assumptions can be based on the Φ-Hiding Assumption [6] , and can be derived by applying the PIR to OT transformation of [30] to the scheme in that paper.
Remark 2.
For the special case of Hamming distance, we have an alternative protocol based on the following idea. Roughly, both parties apply the perfect hashing of the Low-Distance Estimator protocol of [12] for a logarithmic number of levels j, where the jth level containsÕ(2 j ) buckets. To overcome theÕ( √ n) barrier of [12] , instead of exchanging the buckets, the set of buckets is randomly and obliviously sampled. From the samples, an estimate of ∆(a, b) is output. For some j, 2 j ≈ ∆(a, b), so the estimate will be tightly concentrated, and for reasons similar to 2 -Approx, will be simulatable. We omit the details, but note that two advantages of this alternative protocol are that the time complexity will beÕ(n) instead ofÕ(n 2 ), and that we don't need the PRG G, as we may use k-wise independence for the hashing.
Private near neighbor and c-approximate near neighbor problems
We consider the case in which Alice has a point q, and Bob a set of n points P .
Private near neighbor problem
Suppose for some integer U , Alice has q ∈ [U ] d , Bob has P = p 1 , . . . , p n ∈ [U ] d , and Alice should learn min i f (q, p i ), where f is some distance function. In [10] protocols for 1 , 2 , Hamming distance over U -ary alphabets, set difference, and arbitrary distance functions f (a, b) = d i=1 f i (a i , b i ) were proposed, using an untrusted third party. We improve the communication of these protocols and remove the third party using homomorphic encryption to implement polynomial evaluation as in [13] , and various hashing tricks.
In [13] , the authors consider the private all-near neighbors problem in which Alice has n queries q 1 , . . . , q n ∈ [U ] d and wants all p i for which ∆(p i , q j ) ≤ t < d for some j and parameter t. Our techniques improve theÕ(n 2 d) communication of a generic SFE and theÕ(n d t ) communication of [13] for this problem to Õ (nd 2 + n 2 ). Finally, in the common random string model we achieve log d + O(k) communication for the (exact) Hamming distance, and an inner product protocol with d + O(k) communication.
For the details of our schemes, see the full version of our paper [24] . We do not focus on them here since they still suffer from an Ω(n) communication cost. We instead focus on how to privately approximate these problems.
Private c-approximate near neighbor problem
Suppose q ∈ {0, 1} d and p i ∈ {0, 1} d for all i. Let P t = {p ∈ P | ∆(p, q) ≤ t}, and c > 1 be a constant.
Definition 2. A c-approximate NN protocol is correct if when P r = ∅, Alice outputs a point f (q, P ) ∈ P cr with probability 1 − 2
−Ω(k) . It is private if in the computational sense, Bob learns nothing, while Alice learns nothing except what follows from P cr . Formally, Alice's privacy is implied by an efficient simulator Sim for which q, P, f (q, P ) c ≡ q, P, Sim(1 n , P cr , q) for poly(d, n, k)-time machines.
Following [20] , we say the protocol leaks b bits of information if there is a deterministic "hint" function h : {0, 1}
(n+1)d → {0, 1} b such that the distributions q, P, f (q, P ) and q, P, Sim(1 n , P cr , q, h(P, q)) are indistinguishable. As motivated in section 1, we believe these to be natural extensions of private approximations in [12, 20] from values to sets of values.
We give a private c-approximate NN protocol with communicationÕ( √ n+d) and a c-approximate NN protocol with communicationÕ(n 1/3 +d) which leaks k bits of information. Both protocols are based on dimensionality reduction in the hypercube [25] . There it is shown that for an O(log n) × d matrix A with entries i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/d), there is an τ = τ (r, cr) such that for all p, q ∈ {0, 1} d , the following event holds with probability at least 1 − 1/poly(n) If ∆(p, q) ≤ r, then ∆(Ap, Aq) ≤ τ, and if ∆(p, q) ≥ cr, then ∆(Ap, Aq) > τ.
Here, arithmetic occurs in Z 2 . We use this idea in the following helper protocol DimReduce(τ, B, q, P ). Let A be a random matrix as described above. Let S = {p ∈ P | ∆(Ap, Aq) ≤ τ }. If |S| > B, replace S with the lexicographically first B elements of S. DimReduce outputs random shares of S.
DimReduce (τ, B, q, P ):
Bob performs the following computation
-Generate a matrix A as above, and initialize L to an empty list.
A secure circuit with ROM L and input (q, A) executes:
-Compute Aq.
-Lookup Aq in L to obtain S. If |S| < B, pad S so that all S have the same length.
It is an easy exercise to show the correctness and privacy of DimReduce.
Remark 3. As stated, the communication isÕ(dB). The dependence on d can be improved toÕ(d + B) using homomorphic encryption. Roughly, Alice sends E(q 1 ), . . . , E(q d ) to Bob, who sets L(v) to be the first B different E(∆(p i , q)) for which ∆(Ap i , v) ≤ τ . Note that E(∆(p i , q)) is efficiently computable, and has sizeÕ(1) d.
It will be useful to define the following event H(r 1 , r 2 , P ) with r 1 < r 2 . Suppose we run DimReduce independently k times with matrices A i . Then H(r 1 , r 2 , P ) is the event that at least k/2 different i satisfy
The next lemma follows from the properties of the A i and Chernoff bounds:
c-approximate NN protocol
Protocol Overview: Our protocol is based on the following intuition. When |P cr | is large, a simple solution is to run a secure function evaluation with Alice's point q as input, together with a random sample P of roughly a k/|P cr | fraction of Bob's points P . The circuit returns a random point of P ∩ P cr , which is non-empty with overwhelming probability. The communication isÕ(n/|P cr |).
On the other hand, when |P cr | is small, if for k independent trials Alice and Bob run DimReduce(τ (r, cr), |P cr |, q, P ), then with overwhelming probability P r ⊆ ∪ i S i , where S i denotes the (randomly shared) output in the ith execution. A secure function evaluation can then take in the random shares of the S i and output a random point of P r . The communication of this scheme isÕ(|P cr |).
Our protocol combines these two protocols to achieveÕ( √ n) communication, by sampling roughly an n −1/2 fraction of Bob's points in the first protocol, and by invoking DimReduce with parameter B =Õ( √ n) in the second protocol. This approach is similar in spirit to the "high distance / low distance" approach used to privately approximate the Hamming distance in [12] . c-Approx (q, P): DimReduce(τ (r, cr) , B, q, P ) k times, generating shares (S -Let f (q, P ) be a random point from P cr ∩ P = ∅ if it is non-empty, -Else let f (q, P ) be a random point from P r ∩ ∪ i S i if it is non-empty, otherwise set f (q, P ) = ∅. -Output (f (q, P ), null).
Independently run
Using the ideas in Remark 3, the communication isÕ(d + B), since the SFE has sizeÕ(B). Let F be the event that P ∩ P cr = ∅, and put H = H(r, cr, P ).
Correctness: Suppose P r is nonempty. The probability s of correctness is just the probability we don't output ∅.
Privacy Note that Bob gets no output, so Alice's privacy follows from the composition of of DimReduce and the secure circuit protocol of step 5. Similarly, if we can construct a simulator Sim with inputs 1 n , P cr , q so that the distributions q, P, f (q, P ) and q, P, Sim(1 n , P cr , q) are statistically close, Bob's privacy will follow by that of DimReduce and the secure circuit protocol of step 5.
Sim (1 n , P cr , q):
2. With probability 1 − n−|Pcr| B n B −1 , output a random element of P cr , 3. Else output a random element of P r .
Let X denote the output of Sim(1 n , P cr , q). It suffices to show that for each
where we have used Lemma 2. Since Pr
Reducing the dependence on d: The way the current problem is stated, there is an Ω(d) lower bound. We now sketch how, if Alice just wants to learn some coordinate of an element of P cr , this dependence can be made polylogarithmic. The idea is to perform an approximation to the Hamming distance instead of using the E(∆(p i , q)) in the current protocol (see, e.g., DimReduce, and the following remark). The approximation we use is that given in [25] , namely, the parties will agree upon random matrices A i for some subset of i in [n], and from the A i p i and A i q will determine (1 ± ) approximations to the ∆(p i , q) with probability 1 − 2 −k . We don't need private approximations since the parties will not learn these values, but rather, they will input the A i p i , A i q into a secure circuit which makes decisions based on these approximations.
More precisely, Bob samples B of his vectors p i , and in parallel agrees upon B matrices A i and feeds the A i p i into a secure circuit. Alice feeds in the A i q. Let c ≥ 1 + 8 . The circuit looks for an approximation of at most r(1 + 6 ). If such a value exists, the circuit gives Alice the corresponding index. Observe that if |P r(1+4 ) | > √ n, then with probability 1−2 −k an index is returned to an element in P cr , and that this distribution is simulatable. So assume |P r(1+4 ) | ≤ √ n. The parties proceed by running a variant of DimReduce(τ (r, r(1+4 )), B, q, P ), with the important difference being that the output no longer consists of shares of the E (∆(p i , q) ). Instead, for each entry L(v), Bob pretends he is running the approximation of [25] with Alice's point q. That is, the parties agree on B different matrices A i and Bob computes A i p for each p ∈ L(v). A secure circuit obtains these products, and computes the approximations. It outputs an index to a random element with approximation at most r(1 + 2 ). If P r is nonempty, such an index will exist with probability 1 − 2 −k . Also, the probability that an index to an element outside of P r(1+4 ) is returned is less than 2 −k , and so the distribution of the index returned is simulatable.
Finally, given the index of some element in P cr , the parties perform OT and Alice obtains the desired coordinate, The communication isÕ( √ n + polylog(d)).
Locality-sensitive hashing (LSH):
We also have a similar protocol based on LSH, which only achievesÕ(n 1/2+1/(2c) + d) communication, but has much smaller time complexity (though still polynomial). More precisely, the work of the LSH scheme is n O(1) , whereas the work of c-Approx is n O(1/(c−1)
2 ) , which is polynomial only for constant c. See Appendix B for the details.
c-approximate NN protocol leaking k bits
Protocol Overview: We consider three balls P r ⊆ P br ⊆ P cr , where c − b, b − 1 ∈ Θ(1). We start by trying to use dimensionality reduction to separate P r from P \ P br , and to output a random point of P r . If this fails, we try to sample and output a random point of P cr . If this also fails, then it will likely hold that n 1/3 ≤ |P br | ≤ |P cr | ≤ n 2/3 . We then sample down the pointset P by a factor of n −1/3 , obtainingP with survivorsP br ,P cr of P br , P cr respectively. It will now likely hold that we can use dimensionality reduction to separateP br fromP \P cr to obtain and output a random point ofP br . The hint function will encode the probability, to the nearest multiple of 2 −k , that the first dimensionality reduction fails, which may be a non-negligible function of P \ P cr . This hint will be enough to simulate the entire protocol.
The protocol can be implemented in polynomial time with communicatioñ
c-ApproxWithHelp (q, P):
1. Set B =Õ(n 1/3 ). DimReduce(τ (r, br) , B, q, P ) k times, generating shares (S 1 i , S 2 i ). 3. Bob finds random subsets P ,P of P of respective sizes B and n 2/3 . 4. Independently run DimReduce(τ (br, cr) , B, q,P ) k times, generating shares (S
Independently run
or set it to ∅ if it is empty. -Else if P cr ∩ P = ∅, let f (q, P ) be a random point in P cr ∩ P .
-Else let f (q, P ) be a random point in P br ∩ ∪ iSi if it is non-empty, otherwise set f (q, P ) = ∅.
To prove correctness and privacy, we introduce some notation. Let E 1 be the event that the majority of the |S i | are less than B, and E 2 the event that P r ⊆ ∪ i S i . Let F be the event that P ∩P cr = ∅. Let G 1 be the event that 1 ≤P br ≤P cr ≤ B and G 2 the event thatP br ⊆ ∪ iSi . Finally, let H 1 = H(r, br, P ) and H 2 = H(br, cr,P ).
−Ω(k) by Lemma 2. We need two lemmas:
Proof. If H 1 and E 1 occur, then there is an i for which P r ⊆ S i , so E 2 occurs.
Proof. If H 2 and E 2 occur, then the majority of theS i containP br , so G 2 occurs.
Correctness: We may assume P r = ∅. The probability s of correctness is just the probability the algorithm doesn't return ∅. Since F, E 1 , and G 1 are independent,
Case |P br | < B: H 1 implies E 1 since |P br | < B, and using Lemma 3,
−Ω(k) , and thus by Lemma 4, Pr[
Privacy: Note that Bob gets no output, so Alice's privacy follows from the composition of DimReduce and the secure circuit protocol of step 5. Similarly, if we can construct a simulator Sim with inputs 1 n , P cr , q, h(P cr , q) so that the distributions q, P, f (q, P ) and q, P, Sim(1 n , P cr , q, h(P cr , q)) are statistically close, Bob's privacy will follow by that of DimReduce and the secure circuit of step 5.
We define the hint function h(P cr , q) to output the nearest multiple of 2 
Using the independence of F, E 1 , G 1 , and Lemmas 3, 4, we bound Pr[f (q, P ) = p] as follows
On the other hand, since Pr
so that,
, and as shown for correctness, Pr[
−Ω(k) .
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Secure Function Evaluation: In [18, 33] it is shown how two parties holdings inputs x and y can privately evaluate any circuit C with communication O(k(|C| + |x| + |y|)), where k is a security parameter. In [5] it is shown how to do this in one round for the semi-honest case we consider. The time complexity is the same as the communication. We use such protocols as black boxes in our protocols.
B Private c-approximate NN based on locality sensitive hashing
We give an alternative private c-approximate NN protocol, with slightly more communication than that in section 4.2, but less work (though still polynomial). It is based on locality sensitive hashing (LSH) [23] . The fact we need is that there is a family of functions G : {0, 1} d → {0, 1}Õ (1) such that each g ∈ G has description sizeÕ(1), and G is such that for all p, q ∈ {0, Recall that Alice has a point q ∈ {0, 1} d and Bob has n points P ⊆ {0, 1} d . For correctness, Alice should learn a point of P cr provided P r = ∅. For privacy, her view should be simulatable given only P cr .
Our protocol is similar to that in section 4.2. When |P cr | is large, one can run a secure function evaluation with Alice's point q as input, together with a random sample P of roughly a k/|P cr | fraction of Bob's points P . The circuit returns a random point of P ∩P cr which is non-empty with probabiity 1−2
−Ω(k) . The communication isÕ(n/|P cr |).
On the other hand, when |P cr | is small, if Alice and Bob exchange functions g i independentlyÕ(n 1/c ) times, then with overwhelming probability P r ⊆ ∪ i S i , where S i denotes the subset of Bob's points p with g i (p) = g i (q). Using a secure ciruit with ROM, we can obtain these sets S i , and output a random point of P r . The communication isÕ(n 1/c |P cr |). Our protocol balances these approaches to achieveÕ(n 1/2+1/(2c) ) communication.
There are a few technicalities dodged by this intuition. First, even though the parties exchangeÕ(n 1/c ) different g i , and can thus guarantee that each p is in some S i with probability 1−2
−Ω(k) , it may be that whenever p ∈ S i , many points from P \ P cr also land in S i , so that S i is very large. Even though we only expect |P \ P cr |O(1/n) = O(1) points from P \ P cr in S i , since Pr[p ∈ S i ] = Θ(n −1/c ) is small, p may only be in S i when S i is large. Because the size of the S i affects the communication of our protocol, we cannot always afford for the ROM to receive the whole S i (sometimes we will truncate it). However, in the analysis, we show that the average S i is small, and this will be enough to get by with low communication.
Second, we need to extend the notion of a lookup gate given in section 2. Instead of just mapping inputs (i, j) to output R i [j], the jth entry in the ith party's ROM, we also allow j to be a key, so that the output is the record in R i keyed by j. This can be done efficiently using [8] , and Theorem 2 is unchanged, assuming the length of the keys isÕ(1).
LSH (q, P ):
1. Set B =Õ(n 1/2+1/(2c) ) and C =Õ(n 1/c ). 2. Bob finds a random subset P of P of size B . 
